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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD L. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLM'OR,
and C. FRAN·CIS GILLMO·R,
JR.; ·and the ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY, formerly
Case No. 99'93
known as the Island Improvement Company,
Pktintiffs, Respondents
\"S.

EL\\rOOD B. CARTER dba
~ERVICE SALT COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS - RE'SIPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought action in the District Court
of Salt Lake County to protect lands owned by plaintiffs \Yithin said 'County from a continuing ·and
repetitiYe tresp'ass by the defen dant in the use of
a private road traversing lands of pl'aintiffs, and
to pern1anently enjoin the defendant, his a~gen'ts,
servants and employees from further use of ~he roa'd.
1

DISPOSlTION IN THE LOWER COUR'T
Plaintiffs' motion for Summ·ary Judgment was
granted in part and the defen·dant was permanen'tly
enjoined from hauling salt or other minerals on the
road traversing plaintiffs' lands. The Court reserv1
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ed two questions for future trial, ( 1) Whether defendant has acquired any prescriptive right personally to an easement over the lands of plaintiffs for
person·al transportation lby rpassenger car, jeep or
panel truck, as ·a means of access to the shore of
Grea:t Salt Lake for the purpose of exploring and
studying the mineralogical content of the lake and
lakebed lan~ds. (2) W·hether plaintiffs are entitled
to recover damages ~against the defen'dant and defendant's bondsmen for injury claimed by plaintiffs to :have resulted to the road from defen dant's
use of the road for the hauling of salt and minerals
during ·pendency of the actiDn in Distri ct Court, during whiCh time 'defenrdant was permitted use of the
road under a bond given pursuant to order of the
court to !protect the plaintiffs again·st loss result..
ing from defendant's use of the road. The Court refused to :declare the road a public road an d expressed the view that it was bound by the determination
of 'this question in another case involving the same
road which case was entitled Salt Lake County vs.
E,dw~ard L. Gillmor, et als., docket No. 137050 in
the District Court of Salt Lake County. The Court
decline'd to entertain the motion of the defendant
to vacate the order of anofuer division of the same
court requiring defen dant to ·cease usin'g the road
traversing 'lan·ds of plaintiffs in lieu of pos ting a
$100,000.00 ·bonrd to pro'tect plaintiffs from dam'age
resulting to their lands or their herds of sheep and
cattle from defendant's continuing use of the roarct
during the pendency of the 'action.
1

1

1

1

1

2
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SOUGHT ON APPEAL
I>laintiffs seek affirm,ance of th,at portion of
the jttdgmen't of the lower court permanently enJoining the defendant from use of the road traversing plaintiffs lands in the hauling of salt or other
minerals and declaring the road not to be 'a public
road. Plaintiffs seek reversal of that portion of the
judgment rese1·ving for future tri'al the question of
\vhether defen,dant has acquired any personal easetnent or right on the road traversing plaintiff's
lands for personal transportation by jeep, passenger
car, or panel truck as a means of access 'to the S'hore
of Great Salt L·ake for the purpose of exploring ~an'd
studying the mineralogical content of the lake and
lakebed lands for the reason that from tJhe facts disclosed in the deposition of the defendant i t is cle·ar
as a matter of law that 'defendant has no 'such right.
The Plaintiffs request this 'C,ourt to ·dire'ct the lower
court 'to enter its order decreeing that the defen dant
does not have a personal prescriptive right or easement. Plaintiffs take the position that the refusal
by the lower court to entertain defendant's mdtion
to vacate the action of another division of the lower
court in requiring 'bond or remaining off the road,
is not properly before this court for review.
RELIE~-,

1

1

STATEMENT OF FAC,TS
Defendant's statement of facts as set forth in
his brief, consists of an inaccurate summ~ary of the
District Court docket. The "material facts of the
case". as plaintiffs understand the facts to be rna3
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terial within the terms of reference proscribed by
the ;Court Rules, are not to be foun'd therein. Accordingly, plaintiffs submit their own statements
of facts.
Plaintiffs are the owners of lands lying within
Range 2 West, Townships 1 and 2 N'Orth, Salt Lake
Ba'se and Meridian, which :are traversed in part
by a road which commences at a point on the old
Saltair Speedway in the Southeast Quarter of Section 27, :T. 1 N., R. 2 W., (SLB&M, and which road
proceeds northerly to a point ·at the north boundary
of Section ·22, 'T. 1 N., R. 2 W., SL'B&M, and which
then proceeds in a generally n'orthwesterly direetion
through sections 15, 16, '17 and 18 of T. 1 N., R.
2 W., in·to Section f3, T. 1 N. R. 3 W. and thence
to the shore of Great Salt Lake, wh1,ch road has been
popularly known as 1Jhe Islan·d R~anch Road or the
Duck C'lub Road. (R. 31 Findin'g No. 1) From this
point fue road crosse·s a causeway on to Antelope
Island where it is b'arred by a ga:te which is locked.
(R. 159 P. 17 L. 19-22, R. 40 The terminus
of the road is Antelope Island which is private property owned by the Island R'anching Company. (R.
38) T'he road above referred to is a private road
(R. 38) an'd the defendant admitted in his deposition that he h~a;d observe'd gates thereon and signs
indicating that the road was reserved for the use
of ~he lan downers and club members. (R. 159- P.
28, L. 10-13, P. 17 L. 20-22) The defendant
further admitted that at all times when he has used
1

1

1

4
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the road he has observed the gates on the road maintained by plaintiffs and has opened them an'd carefully replaced them after passing through. (R. 159
p. 15 L. 4-7, P. 20 L. 1-9) The defendant
has never hauled salt or other m'ineral from any
operation of his own or with whi'ch he was associated over the road in questi~on until he obtained
some leases from the sta:te whiclh are located at the
southern tip of Antelope Isl~and below the mean·der
line of the Lake, an d these he had acquired only a
year and a :half prior to the taking of his deposition on October 17, 1962. (R 15'9 P. 40 ·L. 9-11 P.
10 L. 17, 18; P. 14 L. 17-2'1, P 21 L. 24-30 P. 22
L. 1-4) The defen·dant does not own any land served
by the road in question. (R 1'59 P. 3 L. 14-18) The
defendant has at all times recognized plaintiffs' ownership of lands traversed by the road in question
and of the dominion whic:h the plaintiffs exercise
o\·er the road. '(R 1'5'9 P. 14 L. 26-'30 P. 15 L. 1-7
'"~ 15-29 P. 19 L. 6-'8) He tried to get persmission
of Mr. Olwell of Island Ranching ·Company to get
by the locke:d gate on Antelope Is'land (R 159 - P.
17 L. 15-28) and of Frank and Ed Gillmor, two of
the plain'tiffs for use of other portions of the road.
(R 159 - P. 38 L. 18-30, P. 3'9 L. 1-11)
He was not successful for both Ol'well an~d ~he Gillmars denied him the ri~ght to use the road. (R 159
P. 17 L. 23-28 P. 39 L. 9-11) Just as soon ~a;s the
plaintiffs became aware of ~defendants use of the
road in questi'on traversin·g their respective lands,
1

1
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for the hauling of salt and other minerals and equipment, they gave prompt notice to defendant by letter
dated October 16, 1961 over the signature of their
attorney, Allen H. Tibbals, to cease using the road.
(R 159 P. 34 L. 22-30 P. 35 L. 1-7) Defendant ignored the notice given by plaintiffs and continued
with his 'hauling until December 1961. (R. 159 P. 35
L. 1-7, 15-18) Defendant commenced h:auling again
in the spring of 1962 and this action was promptly
commen·ced by the plaintiffs to enjoin the defendant from the continuing trespass. (R 159 P. 35
L. 19-25) R. 1-11) By stipulation the Court permitted the defendant to use the road until October 1962
under a $'500.00 bond posted by defendant in lieu
of yielding the use of the road pending the outcome
of the litigation. (R 8-11) In October 196'2, after
hearing the motion of the Plaintiffs, the court permitted the continued use of the road by defendant
pending the determination of the suit but required
an increase in the bon·d to $2'500.00. (R 18, 21, 25,
31-35) In the spring of 1963 defendant was barred
from use of the road unless he posted a bond of
$100,000.00 which was required by the Court to
protect the plaintiffs from loss which might be suffered by them and their livestock comp'any due to
the defend·ant continuing to haul through their lambing and grazing groun·ds in the season of heaviest
use by plaintiffs. (R. 52-56, 59, 60) Throughout
the entire period of litigation defendant has nev~r
shown any evidence of a right to use the road In
6
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question. The record is totally devoid of any proof
of a right in defendant to traverse the lands of plaintiffs though defendant claimed to have traversed
the road to the lakeshore in a passenger car, jeep
or panel truck, since 1934 when he became interested in minerals, for the purpose of prospecting and
testing the mineral content of the lake. (R 159 P. 22
L. 16-18, P. 19, L. 8-28)
A la\v suit was commen'ced during the pendency

of this litigation, by Salt Lake County as plaintiff,
seeking to have the road in qu·estion declared a public road. This case docketed in S·alt Lake County
District Court as case number 137050 joined the
plaintiffs herein as defen·dants. The county case was
disn1issed with prejudice on stipulation of the parties. (R. 106, 107)
Based on the defendant's admissions in his
deposition, the lack of proof of any n·ature to support defendant's contention that he had a prescriptiYe right, and the dismissal with prejudice of th·e
claim of Salt Lake County th!at the road was a public road, the plaintiffs filed a motion for Summary
Judgment and supported the same with affidavits
in addition to the record. (R 36-44 inc.) The Court
after a hearing thereon granted the motion in part
and entered a summary judgment denying defen. .
dant any right to use the road traversing plaintiffs
lands to haul salt or other minerals but reserved
for future determination after trial the question
of whether defendant had a right to make personal
7
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use of the road for his own transportation to and
from the lakeshore an·d also the question of the plaintiffs claim of damages. (R 106-108)

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs concede the correctness of the action
of the court below in reserving the question of the
dam·ages to which plaintiffs may be entitled, if
any, resulting from defendants use of the road
pending the outcome of the litigation, as the issues
to be determined thereon do involve disputed issues
of fact. Accordingly no appeal has been prosecuted
from this portion of the decision. Plaintiffs are convinced th·at the Court correctly granted the injunction restraining defen·dant from further use of the
road traversing plaintiff's lands for hauling salt
or other minerals. Pl!aintiffs believe the Court erred
in not also determining that ·defendant had no right
to the use of the road for any purpose whatever,
and believe the Court should have restrained defendant from :any further use of the road for any
purpose. It is in support of this position that plaintiffs will direct their :argument in this Court. to
Plaintiffs fail to perceive the relevancy (j{ the
·determin·ative issues involved in the case, of the ~argu
ments put forth by the defendant/in his brief. These
matters ·appear to be colla teral and of little consequence if the court below ·correctly decided the pri~
cip·al issues before it. Plaintiffs therefore present
their answer to defen·dant's argument, as well as the
argument of plaintiffs in support of their position on
1

8
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the mPrits of the cause, under descriptive headings
chosen by plaintiffs rather than under the hea'dings
of the defendant's brief.
POINT I.
THE SUl\Il\IARY JUDGMENT OF 'THE COURT BELOW DETER'MINING THAT 'DEFE'NDAN'T HA·D NO
RIGHT TO H.AUL SAI.lT OR OTHER MINERALS ON
THE ROAD TRAVERSING PLAIN'TIF~S lJANDS, AN D
PERlVIANENTLY ENJOINING HIM FR,OM so DIOING
IS CORREICT AND SHOULD 'BE SUSTAINED.
1

Defendant bases his claim to a right to utilize
the road tl'aversing plaintiffs' lands on three inconsistent theories. While none of the three theories is
consistent with the others, it is apparently permissible to proceed to hearing, un·der todays relaxed
rules of pleading, without ever being compelled to
make an election as to which theory is to be relied
upon. However, while permitted to plea:d inconsistently and submit proof which may support any of
the inconsistent theories plead, it is still essential
that the proved and admitted facts support one of
the theories plead. This requirement defena'ant has
been totally unable to meet.
The theories upon which defendant relied are:1. That defendant has acquired :a precriptive
right by more than thirty years use of the
road adversely ·and hostilely to plaintiffs
ownership. (R. 14-15 'Par. 2.) (AppelLant's
Brief Point II.)
-~
2. That the general public has use·d the road
9
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for more than thirty years and that it is
therefore a public road. ( R. 15 P~ar. 3, Appellant's Brief Point V.)
3. That in some manner never explained by
defen'dant a "way of necessity" exists. (R.
114 P~ar. (d) Appellant's Brief P'oint III.)
(Note: To the best of Plaintiff's knowle'dge this -contention was not plead nor
argued to the District Court by Defendant.
H'owever, the Defendant now seeks to present this contention in this Court, and since
the theory is clearly not applicable to the
·admitted facts under the law established
in this State, we nevertheles:s present our
views negatin'g this theory, even though
we do not believe it to be properly presented
by the defen·dant in this 'Court not having
been first presented to the District Court.)
None of the foregoing theories can be supported
from the facts admitted by the defendant himself
in his deposition. ( R. 15'9) The defendant in his
brief attempts to raise an issue as to whether the
lower court could correctly decide this case on summ!ary ju·dgment an·d in so doing gives the impression that the lower court was guided solely by the
plea·dings and affidavits. This is not the fact. The
cases 'Cited by the defendant in support of his position that a case may not 'be tried by afffdavit, and
~h'at issues of fact cannot be ·determined on summary jud·gment if controverted have no bearing here
10
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for the defendant's deposition was taken, an·d the
action of the district court is supported on the statements the defendant himself made in his deposition.

The attempt by counsel for defendant to make
it appear that because the defendant's plea'dings
are at issue with the :affidavits of the plaintiffs
there is a cont1·overted issue of fact necessitating
trial overlooks completely the fact tha;t the defendant
himself in his deposition stated the facts upon which
plaintiff relied for support of the Summ·ary Judgment.
e are n'Ot here confronted with an area
of the law in which there is doubt, or va:gu·eness of
effect or ap·plication to 'the facts. T h is ·C o u r t
has spoken, an·d clearly defined the requisites for
the acquisition of rights to traverse the land of another. Applying the law as pronounced by this Court
to the facts admitted by the defen·dant in ·his deposition taken in this case it is clear th·at the defendant has not acquired any right to 'the use of the
road in question for any purp·ose. Summ1ary judgment procedure is so entirely suitable to this case
that it is almost a classic text ·book situation for
its use. This Coutt has so recognized and defined
the law and rules of court relating to Summ:ary
Judgment. We refer to the ·case of Dupler v. Yates,
10 U2d 251, 351 P2d 624, wherein near~y an identical situation prevailed. There fue movant for summary judgment did precisely what plaintiffs do in
this case, relied upon the statements of ·the adversary made in the adversaries deposition an·d by

'r
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which the adversary was bound, and this Court commented:"* * * In contrast to self-serving declarations
usually proffered by movants for summ~ary
judgment, these statements are made by the
parties themselves. * * *" (351 P2d 624 at
636-6.)
The Court then concluded in its opinion at page
636 of the Pacific reports : "The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations of
the pleadings, show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, although :an issue may
be raised by the pleadings, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * *"
T'his Court re-affirmed this position in the case
of Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 14 U2d
101, 377 P2d 1010 wherein the Court stated:"* * * Summary judgments can properly be
granted under Rule 56(c) only if 'the pleadings, depositions, an,d admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any,' which are
offered, show without dispute that the party
is entitled to prevail. This 'Condition is obviously not met if the allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint stand in opposition to the averments
of the affidavits so that there are controverted issues of fact, the determination of which
is necessary to settle the rights of the parties.
The trial judge correctly ruled that th~re
were such issues of fact here. The cases rehed
upon by the defendant are distinguisha~le,
since an admittedly different sitwation extSts
where the averments in the affidavits or facts
12
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shown by depositions and or exhibits would
indisptttably resolve the material facts. * * *"
(emphasis ours)
Proceeding then to an examination of the facts
and of the law upon which the lower court granted
plaintiffs' motion for Summary Judgment we find
that the law applicable to the situation here pre~Pnted was expounded in this state in the Case of
Jlorris 1'. Blunt, 49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127 and has
been repeatedly re-affirmed by this Court. The factual situation in the Morris v. Blunt case as stated
by the court involved nearly the same situation as
that here presented.
"The defendants admit that plaintiff owns the
land in question but they claim a right of way
across a part of said land for themselves, and
that the roadway so used by them is a public
highway. * * *" ( 161 P. at 1128.)
So too in the instant case the ownership of the
lands traversed by the roads is not in issue. As an
outgrowth of a hearing involving the bond required
of the defendant the lower court made an express
finding on this matter which finding has never at
any time been put in issue by the defendant or raised
on appeal from said Findings and judgment, and
was in fact included by the defendant in the amendments to the findings which the defendant made.
(R31Par.1)

We now quote at length from the opinion in Morris v. Bl1tnt because the Court there sets out 'all of
the determinative criteria 'by which the contentions
13
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of the defendant as to the public highway and prescriptive easement are to be evaluated.
"* * * They rely upon three grounds to hold
the road in question, to wit: ( 1) That by long
continual use it has become a public highway;
(2) that by their and Mrs. Kersey's use they
have an easement by prescription; ( 3) that
said road was gran ted by said deed, both by
the description of a road one rod wide, specially described, and also by reason of said road
being appurtenant to the land conveyed in the
deed. We will examine these questions in
order:
First, that by long continual use the 20
rods of road in question has become a public
highway; that is, that there has been a dedication by the owner to the public use and an
acceptance by the public.
[1] A dedication rests primarily in the
intent of the owner. There must be a concession intentionally made by him, which may be
proved by declarations or by acts, or may be
inferred from circumstances. No form or ceremony is necessary. It must, however, appear
that he knew of the use by the public, and intended to grant the right of way to the public. No formal ~acceptance by any public officer or agent is necessary, but there must be
actual use by the public. City of Cincinnati v.
White, 6 Pet. 440, 8 L. Ed. 452; Morgan v.
Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 723, 24 L. Ed. 743;
Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah, 227, 26
Pac. 291; Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah,
240, 51 Pac. 980; Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah,
305, 64 Pac. 955; Culmer v. Salt Lake City,
27 Utah, 252, 75 Pac. 620; Wilson v. Hull, 7
Utah, 90, 24 Pac. 799.
14
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r2, 3] From the evidence, it ~appears th~at
the p1ain'tiff, 2 years ·before the commencement of this action, plowed the road to the
canal bank; 'that frequently in plowing lands
adjoining the road plaintiff rolled boulders
from the land into the roa·d, which the defendants removed 'before they coul d travel the
road; th·at plaintiff closed the road extending
west from the Kersey crossing 5 years before
the commencement of this action ; that a wire
gate was place·d by the plaintiff a'cross the entrance to the road on the east section line 7
years 'before the commencement of this :action;
and that the road was plowed by fthe plaintiff
as much ~as 10 years before the commencement
of this action.
All these facts negative an intention on
the pa~t of the plaintiff to dedica te to public
use. On the contrary, the fair inferen'ce to be
drawn from them is that he intended not to
dedicate the roadway to the public. I t is true
that, a dedication by the owner and an acceptance by the public on!ce made, the ·highway
thus established continues to be a 'highway as
long as the public use continues; and if in
this case the public use were sufficient to constitute an acceptance and the owner h:a'd in
fact intended to dedicate, then the ·dedieation
would be complete; bult we think there is no
evidence tending to show that there ever was
an intent to de'dicate to pu'bli'c use.
1

1

1

1

[ 4-6] ~ext we m~st co?sider t~e people
~ho us~d this roa·d. Dl'd the1~ traveling upon

It. const1ftute a use by the public? Tihe evidence
disclose~ three cl'ass~s of persons only who
used this road, 'to Wit, the occupants of the
Kersey place and their visitors, the workmen
15
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upon the canal, and some persons who lived in
the middle of the section.
As to the occupants of the Kersey place
they had an express grant of a right of way
for ingress and egress contained in their title
deed (not considerin·g now the extent or limitation of the rirght conveyed in the deed), so
they were not travelin·g the road by reason
of its public character, 'but under the expres'S
provision of their deed.
As to the workmen upon the c:anal, they
were there under the right by ''user'' claimed
by their company. The right of way for their
canal, whatever it is, if it authorizes the occupancy of the land for canal purposes, carries
with it the right, un·der reasonable limitations
to enter the preml.ses to construct, repair, and
operate the ·canal, rts headgates, its laterals,
etc., which are a part of or connected therewith. So !these persons were not on this road
by reason of its public character, but under
whatever right by "user" the can:al company
had over this land for canal purposes.
As to the persons who lived in the center
of the section, the evidence 'doe's not disclose
how many there are or ever were, how frequently they used the road, by what right they
traveled the road, nor the circumstances of
their use, nor that they h:ave in any way improved their property depen·ding upon t~e
public use of the road, nor th~at they are 1n
any respect so situated that 'Closing the road
will be an injury to them. Compare the case
made as to 1them with the situation disclosed
in the case of ·Schettler v. Lynch, '2'3 'Utah,
305, 64 Rae. 955.
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However, the people in the middle of this
section are not in court, and their rights are
not being determined. Their u~e of the roa d
is tnaterial here only so far as It may ·have a
bearing upon its public chara·cter, 1and the
l'Yidence as to their use of the road in question is very meager.
Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, § 1115,
provides:
''A highway shall be deemed to 'have 'been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
'~A "thoroughfare" is a place or way
through which there is passing or travel. It
becomes a "public thoroughfare" when the
public have a general right of p·assage. Under this statute the highway, even though it
be over privately owned grouna, will 'be deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public use
when the public has con'tinuously used it as a
thoroughfare for 'a period of 10 years, but
such use must be by the ~public. Use under
private right is not sufficient. If the throughfare is laid out or used as 'a private way, its
use, however long, as a private way, does not
make it a public way; and the mere fact that
the public also m'ake use of it, without objection from the owner of the land, will not make
it a public way. ·Before it ~becomes public in
Character the owner of the land must consent
to the change. EITiott, Roads and Streets, § 5.
1

From a consideration of the facts in evidence, viewed in the li·ght of the well-establis·hed principles of law, we must conclude as ·did
the trial court, that there is disclosed ~o such
17
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intention on the part of the owner of the land
to dedicate to public use, nor such use by the
pu·blic constituting an acceptance as is necessary to show a dedication or abandonment
to public use.
[!] The secon~ contention of the appellants 1s that by their and Mrs. Kersey's use
they have an easement by prescription.
'''The right to a public road or private
way by prescription arises from the uninterrupted adverse enjoyment of it under a claim
of right known to the owner for the requisite
length of time. Anciently the right to the easement arose by prescription from the use of
the land for so long a time that there was no
existing evidence as to when such use commenced. Its origin must ·have ·been at a time
'Whereof the memory of m·an runneth not to
the contrary.' Later the rule was changed by
limiting the time of uninterrupted possession
to 20 years.'' Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7
U~tah, 2'2·9, 26 Pac. 2H2.
"Prescription refers the right to the highway to the presumption that it was originally
established pursuant to law, by proper authority; while dedication refers it to a contract
either expressed or implied. Dedication iJ?plies a conveyance and an acceptance, w~Ile
prescription requires an unbroken possession
or use under claim of right." Elliott, Roads
and Streets, § 191.
A prescriptive right to an easement do~s
n·ot arise in 7 years, by an·alogy to the proVIsion of the statute barring an action to recover real property when the· person assertin·g ti tie was not seized or possessed of the
18
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property in question within 7 years. These
statutes do not apply to rights of way or any
other class of easement by prescription. The
right by prescription can only a~ise by. a'dverse use and enJoyment under cla1m of r1ght
uninterrupted and continuous for a period of
20 years. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah,
227 26 Pac. 291; Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah,
238: 61 Pac. 1006; North Point Co. v. U. & S.
L. Co., 16 Utah, 271, 52 Pac. 16'8, 40 L. ?· A.
851, 67 Am. St. Rep. 607; Lund v. W1lcox,
34 Utah, 205, 97 Pac. 33.
[8] A prescriptive right in the public is
disposed of by our conclusion, heretofore
reached, that the evidence does not show use
by the public, and that this was not a public
highway; but there is still the question of a
private right of way by prescription. Under
the well-established rule, the use, in order
that it may ripen into a prescriptive title,
must, in .any case, not only be adverse and
continuous, an'd under claim of right for a
period of 20 years, but it must be uninterrupted throughout that period. In the case at
bar the use of the defendants and their predecessors commenced in 1887, at which time
there \Yas a severance of the title to the parcels of land, and could not ripen into title by
prescription until 1907. But the defendants'
own testimony shows that the plaintiff plowed the road in question as early as 1904, and
from that time to the commencement of this
action the plaintiff, from time to time, placed
~~k.s in the road, from the plowed land adJOining, and that the defendants, with shovels
leveled the ground and removed the rocks t~
the .north to make the road passable ; and folloWing these acts, and clearly indicatin'g the
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attitude of each of the parties to this suit to
the claim of the defendants to the ownership
of this right of way at about the time the
20-year period would ~have expired, plaintiff
placed :a wire gate across the road at the point
where it left the public highway, and the defendants cut it down. From these circumstances we conclude that the use was not uninterrupted, ·and that no right by prescription could arise under these circumstances.
Wasatc·h Irrig. Co. v. Fulton, 23 Utah, 466
6'5 Pac. 205; Crosier v. Brown, 66 W. va:
273, 66 S. E. 326, 25 L. R. A. (N. S,) 174;
Reid v. Garnett, 101 Va. 4·7, 4'3 ·s. E. 182;
Wooldridge v. Coughlin, 4'6 W. Va. 345, 33
S. E. 23'3.
Comparin·g the facts :testified to by the defendant in his deposition in this ~case with the facts and
the law in the case qudted, there is no basis upon
wh1i~ch defendant's claims may be supported. We find
that the defen'dant admits tllat he had never hauled
any salt or other product in trucks across the land of
phtin'tiffs until one year and a ihalf before the taking
of his 'deposition. (R 159. 10 Lines 17, 18; P. 14
Lines 17-21, P. 21 Lines ·24-30 P. 2·2 Lines 1-4
He at one time hauled some salt from a Mr.
T·homas but ;had no ide·a ·how much an·d it was for a
short time. '(R. 159 P. 14 Lines 17-22) The defendant filed an affidavit of his attorney W. H.
Henderson, in which Mr. Hen·derson points out that
Thomas was a lessee of the plaintiff Gillmors during
the period of time of his operation there and attaches as exhibits to the affidavit copies of the
1
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hotnas lease with the Plaintiff, Gillmors. (R. 96,
r) Some effort is made by the defendant's coun!l to claim that because the lease with plaintiff
illmors did not make express mention of the use
r the road in question, that Thom·as's use of th~
Jad could be assumed to be without permission of
1e plaintiffs and that this was evidence of an aderse use or the public character of the road. This
osition does not give credence to the established
1w, long recognized that a lessee's acts are permisive and not hostile to the owner.
"Moreover, sin·ce an easement by prescription rests upon the presumption of a grant,
the period during which the owner of ·a tract
claimed to be dom·inant was in possession of
it as a tenant of the owner of a tract claimed
to be servient cannot be considered as ·a part
of the prescriptive period. Thus, the time during which a tenant uses a way over adjoining
property of his landlord, while he holds land
as the tenant of the latter, cannot be counted,
as against the landlord, as a part of the prescriptive period in establis·hing an easement.
* * *" 32 Am. Jur. Landlord & Tenant - P.
46, Sec. 23.
Furthermore, the 'defendant offered no proof
Jf any nature, 'by affidavit, deposition or otherwise
Jf any privity between himself and Thomas.
Under the doctrines announced in the case of
l/orris v. Bl1tnt, above quoted, the defendant, clearly, by his own testimony, has not acquired a prescriptive right to haul salt or other minerals across
the lands of plaintiffs for he has not don·e so for
21
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the pres'criptive period of twenty years and he has
never done so adversely, except for the few months
between the date of the letter of plaintiffs' October
16th, 196'1 demanding that he cease using the road
(R 15'9 P. 34 L. 2·2-30, P. 85 L. 1-7) to his use under
bond by order of the court given in this case, a
space of only 7 months. (R 159 P. 3'5 Lines 1-7,
1'5-17)
Any conten tion tha:t the road was a public road
is put at rest under the announced criteria of the
Blunt case, by the defendant's own statements
wherein he admits that he has found a closed gate
near the Gillmor corrals on the road, (R 159 p. 14
lines 26-30) signs declaring the road to be for
the use of landowners and gun club members only
(R 159 P. 28 lines 8-20 an·d p. 29, line 1) a watchman who bars the road to all except those who can
identify themselves as having perm'issi'on to go
through the gate (R 159 p. 28 lines 21-24, P. 15
lines '15-30 p. 16 lines 1-10) all of whi'ch is totally
inconsistent with any dedication of the road to thr.
public by the owner.
1

The claim of public road fails for another reason as well, and that is the failure to submit any eviden,ce of the public actually making use of the road.
The defendant referred to use by only such people
as the "State" to go out to Antelope Island (R 159
p. 29 L. 10) Mr. Thomas who had a salt lease (R
9, 94) the mosquito abatement people (R 159 P.
29 L. 6-7) and some unidentified rabbit hunters,
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rho so far as the defendant testified may have been
utright trespassers (R 159 P. 29 L. 17) and some
eople who maintain the canal (R. 159 P. 2'9 L. 29)
,he Court in the Morris v. Blunt case discussed
ll of these uses and concluded that such a showing
·ould not support a claim that this was a use by
he public.
Plaintiffs have chosen to set fotth the facts and
he law in the argument on this claim that the road
~'as public, despite the fact that the court below gave
s its announced reason for its decision on ~his point
he dis1nissal with prejudice of t:he Salt Lake 'County
a\vsnit to declare this road a public road which it
onsidered made the matter res judicata. We wish
lO uncertainty as to whether the defendant could
.ave proved this to be a public road if given the op~ortunity. Forgetting the fact that the County S:uit
eeking to establish this road as a public road was
.ismissed with prejudice, the lower court coul d have
orrectly found it was not a public road :based on
he facts as given by the defendant himself under
he recognized law announced in Morris vs. Blunt
hove quoted.
1

Since the matter of prescriptive right and pubtc road have been disposed of as above set forth,
his then leaves to the defen·dant only one remaining
heory by which he claimed a right across the land
f plaintiffs. This third and last theory is a way of
ecessity. As previously indicated this was not argud to the lower court, nor plead, and is first sub1
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mitted in this court. But recognizing that it is·
better to consider the substance than to stand on
technicalities we wish to point out ito the court that
the law in regard to establis·hment of ways of necessity is clear and unequivocal. This Court in the case
of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 U. 2·2, 19 7 P2d 117 set
out the requirements for estalJlishment of a way of
necessi'ty quoting the case of Morris v. Blunt, as
follows:1

"* * * The requirements for a way of necessity are set out in the case of Morris v. Blunt,
49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127, 1132, as follows:'(1) Unity of ·title followed by severance;
C2) That at the time of the severance the
servitude was apparent, obvious and visible;
( 3) That the easement is reason:ably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate;
and
( 4) It must usually be continuous and selfacting, as distinguished from one used only
from time to time when occasion arises.' * * *"
In the same case the Court continues a little further
on in the opinion,
"* * * The distinction between a way of necessity and a prescriptive right is set out in Bertolina v. Frates, 89 U 2'38, 57 P2id 346, 350,
as follows: 'Ways of necessity arise by virtue
of conditions entirely different from ways
created by prescription. A prescriptive right
can be acquired by anyone. It may be appurten·ant or in gross. There need be no connection so far as the chain of title is concerned
1
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between servient and dominant estates, but
ways of necessity exist only where the title
springs
.
f rom a common source. ' * * *"
In the instant case the defen·dant admits that
he owns no property served by the road in question.
(R 159 P. 3 L. 14-18) Defendant attempts to claim
through the state lease he holds on the salt lands off
Antelope Island, but there is no possibility of compliance with the conditions above set forth requisite
to creation of a way of necessity an·d the physical
facts shown by the map attached as an exhibit to
the defendants deposition (R 1'59) clearly demonstrate the physical impossibility of mee'ting the requisites.
Having examined the defendants three theories
by which he claimed a right across lan·ds of the plaintiffs in the light of his own statemen ts 'Contained in
his deposition and the law applicable thereto, we
submit that the Summary judgment entered by the
lower court denying to the defendant the right to
use the road traversing plaintiffs' lands for the hauling of salt or other minerals should be affirmed.
1

POINT II.
THE DEICISION OF THE LOWER COURT RESERVING FOR FUTURE TRIAL TIHE QUESTI 0N 'OF
WHETHER THE D'E'FENDANT HAD A RIGHT TO
PERSONALLY CROSS PLAINTIFFS LAN'DS IN A PASSENGER CAR, J·EEP OR 'PANEL TRUCK TO GET TO
THE SHORE OF GREAT SALT LAKE FO·R THE PURPOSE OF MAKING MINERAL SURVEY'S IS ERRIONEOUS AND THE COURT SH·OULD HAVE ENTERE'D
ITS ·JUDGMENT DENYING THIS RIGHT TO TH'E DE1
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FENDANT, AND ENJO~INING FURTHER TRESPASS
BY D'E FE'NDANT ON LAND S OF PLAINTIFFS.
1

1

1

The lower court out of an abundance of caution
and we believe based upon a misinterpretation of'
the recently handed down decision on Summary
Judgments in the case of Christensen v. Financial
Service Co., 14 U 2'd 101, 377 P·2d 1010, reserved
the question, as containing a disputed issue of fact,
of whether or not defendant ·had acquired a personal right to cross the lands of the plaintiffs in a passenger car, jeep or panel truck for the purpose of
getting to the shore of Great Salt Lake and there
making tests of the mineral content of the water
and shore lands. The defendant's counse1 argued 'that
sin·ce defendant in his complaint 'claimed to have
used the road traversing plaintiffs lan ds for thirty
years for this purpose that an issue of fact was
created desplite the fact that the statement in the
complaint was not born out by the defendant's deposition. The lower court expressed the view that
under the doctrine of the C·hristensen case, above
referred to, that if an issue was raised by the pleadings lthe issue could not 'be resolved by affidavit
or deposition We do not so read the Christensen
case. A deposition constitutes the testimony of the
party whose ·de·position is taken. He may not change
his story without challenge and impeachmen t in the
trial court. Neither by affidavit or in any other
manner has the defen·dant in this case indicated
any de'Sire to change his story from that taken in
the deposition. The facts to which the defendant
1

1
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testified clearly show that as a matter of law he
has no right to use the road traversing the lands
of the plaintiffs for any purpose whatever.
The defendant in his deposition admitted that
when he used the road in question he found gates
thereon, and that they were usually closed and that
he \vithout exception always re-closed them. (R 159
I). 14 line 26)

Q. During that period of time, Mr. Carter, have you ever observed that the road is
closed by gates at several points where it
crosses through the Gillmor lands?
A. I have observed gates at a point
close by their sheds there on some occasions,
yes, in the spring.
Q. And those gates have been up or
down as the case might be when you got there?
A. Ye·s.
Q. Have you ever taken them down
yourself to go through?
A. Yes.
Q. And have you replaced them as you
went through?
A. You bet.
R 159 P. 19 Lines 9-30 inc. P. 20 Lines 1-9 inc.
Q. Now how many times in a year
would you go out this road Mr. ·Carter?
A. ,,~ell al l during the year. That is the
purp~se of st~dying the minerals in there,
especially sodium sulp·hate, the con·dition
1
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where it makes its deposits. The salt makes
its depositions in the summer and fall and
the sodium sulphate makes its depositions in
the winter and is picked back up in the summer :as weather conditions change, so I made
a study on it for the amount there. You would
have to make periodic trips about all during
the winter and summer months to study this
kind of stuff.
Q. How many times are we talking
about?
A. I am talking about 12, 15 times a
year to go out there.
Q. And this once again is just for your
personal transportation? In other words, you
aren't hauling any equipment or using big
trucks?
A. We use some equipment. It isn't
heavy, it isn't 'big trucks, usually panel trucks
or jeeps with ,a box on it that you could carry
augers in and test tubes or bottles to obtain
samples.
Q. An·d at any time that you have gone
out there during the winter or early spring
you generally found the gate approximately
here next to the Gillmor property closed, have
you not, ~and had to take it down and put it
back up?
A. At the point that is circled there,
yes. (On map attached as exhibit to the deposition which point is near the center of section
2'2 and circled and m,arked in ink Duck Club
Gate - our explanation) There is a gate
there, a 'good gate, and it is usually closed.
I have saw it when it wasn't ;and I have taken
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occasion to stop when I went through there
and closed it because there is a sign on the
gate that says, "Please keep the gate closed"
and "Thank you"; and I being a stockman,
\vhy I recognized the fact that the stock could
get out."
Again the defendant recognized the dominion
and ownership of the ·plain'~iffs when ·he sought pernlission from Gillmors and from Mr. Olwell of the
I~land Ranching Company to use the road. (R 159
P. 39 L. 1-11 inc. P. 17 lines r5-28 inc.) The use
thus described by defendant himself certainly does
not meet the standards set by this court for attainment of a right by prescription This court said in
the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 U. 4'81, 39 P2d
1073,

"* * * A twenty year use alone of a way
is not sufficient to establish an easement.
Mere use of a roadway opened by a landowner for his own purposes will be presumed permissiYe. An 'antagonistic or adverse use of a
way cannot spring from a permissive use. A
prescriptive title must be acquired :adversely.
It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a
license or mere neighborly accommodation.
Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive
user. If the use is accompanied by 'any recognition in express terms or by implication of
a right in the landowner to stop such use now
or at some time in the future the use is not
adverse. * * *" Cited with approval in the
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case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 U. 22, 19'7 P2d
117 at 112 3.
1

Again in the case of Lunt v. Kitchens t2·3 U 488
260 p 2d 535.

''* * * T·he use by the Kitchenses added no burden to the driveway; they did not :attempt to
widen it, nor to interfere with fue use by the
W eidners. Where a person opens the way for
use of his own premises and another uses it
without interfering wi~th the landowner's use
or causing him damage, the presumption is
that the use was rpermissive and in the absence
of proof to the contrary, the person so using
it does not ,acquire a right of way by prescription. * * *"
In the instant case the use by defendant for obtaining samplings at the lake shore falls e~actly
into the categories here set out and delineated in the
cases ci ted as permissive. An d this is borne out by
defendant's asking permission of the owners as well
as his recognition of ~the landowners gates and request th~at they be kept shut. In view of these circumstances, wh'ich cannot be altered by testimony
of others, we submit the lower court should have
found tha;t the defendant had not acquired any prescriptive right against the plaintiffs and should
h·ave granted an injunction permanently barring
defen·dant from further use of the road traversing
plaintiffs' lands.
1

1
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POINT III.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE LOWER c~OURT
CORRECTLY GRANTED PLAINTI'FFS REQUEST FOR
I~CI~EASE OF BOND AND ORDERE~D ·DEFENDANT
TO REMAIN OFF THE ROAD OR p·osT A '$100,000
BOND IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS CO'URT
FOR CONSIDERATI'ON.

On August 1st, 1963, just prior to hearing of
the case on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment the defendant fi1ed a Notice of Motion for
\·acation of an Order of the Court which had then
been in effect from the 11th day of March 19'63 by
the terms of which defendant was barred from use
of the road unless he posted a $100,000 bond. No
protest was m~ade by defendant at the time of the
granting of this order. The hearing on the bond was
before the Honorable Stewart M. H1anson, Judge.
-\.t the hearing of plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, the defendant attempted to argue his
tnotion to vacate the order. This the Court :declined
to hear since under the rules of the District Court
one judge will ndt review the action nf ~another judge
of the same district in the absence of special circumstances, and there were no such circumstances
shown here. This was explained by the ·court to the
counsel for defendant who made no objection thereto. In fact counsel indicated that the decision by the
court on the matter Of the defendant's right to use
of the road rendered moot ~this question, and it so
remains at this juncture. If the decision of this
court sustains the holding of the lower court 'bar4
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ring the defendant from use of the road, this matter
is moot and of no concern. If the decision of this
court should reverse the decision of the lower court
and remand the case for further proceedings, then
the lower court would be the proper forum in which
to determine any issue on the bond.

CON·CLUSIION
T·he defendant is an opportunist. Wi1Jhout investment by the defendant, by imposing on the pfaintiffs and usurping their lan·ds bought, paid for and
maintained by them, and upon which they pay taxes
so th'at they may use them in their livestock business as they see fit, the defen'dant seeks to conduct
a business profi'table to himself. l't is against such
adventurers that the courts lhave long stood as the
bulwark, protecting the property and rights of the
owners a·gainst those who without righ't or responsi'bili1ty would appropri:a:te the benefits. 'The decision of the lower court denying to defendant the
~right to haul sal't or other mineral across the lands
of plaintiffs and permanently enjoining him from
the use of 'illle s·ubje·ct road in so ·doing should be
affirmed. In so far as the decision of the lower court
reserved for future tri:al the question of defendant's
claim to a prescriptive easement over the lands of
the pl~aintiffs for transportation by passenger car,
jeep or panel truck for the conducting of mineral·
ogica'l surveys of the lake, the decision should be
reversed 'and rem:ande·d with instructions to the court
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to enter judgment denying to the defendant any

right to traverse the lands of the plaintiffs for any
purpose whatever, an:d ·perm,anently enjoining the
defendant from further use of the road traversin·g
plaintiffs lan·ds.

Respe·ctfully submitted,
ALLEN H. TIBBALS
Suite 604 - '315 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for
Plaintiffs-Respondents.
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